In Progress and Regression, social philosopher Rahel Jaeggi wants to make the concepts of progress and regression fruitful again. This is a challenging project, as post- and decolonial criticism has left progress in a rather battered state in recent years. For example, back in 2016, Amy Allen criticised in The End of Progress that renowned representatives of recent critical theory (that is, Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth and Rainer Forst) postulate a universal progress of history. This is problematic, as it ignores the fact that progress has also served to justify the West’s imperial claims to power from the eighteenth century to the present day. In order to circumvent this problem, authors of the current debate (such as British philosopher Philip Kitcher) attempt to develop pragmatic concepts of progress that try to avoid strong normative justifications. Against this background, Jaeggi comes up with a formal concept of progress which, from a Hegelian perspective, ties in with older critical theory and is intended to understand progress as a form of social change.
According to Jaeggi, we are all familiar with the failures and successes of life’s endeavours, but these are not final and can also turn into their opposite. Jaeggi therefore argues that progress is ‘a form of change’ (xii). Progress is a certain process that does not simply lead to a specific goal. Therefore, although ‘the possibility of a different world’ (xii) remains present, it cannot be anticipated. Accordingly, Jaeggi is less concerned with the normative content of progress, as in recent critical theory. Rather, following first-generation critical theory – especially Theodor W. Adorno – the concept of progress is intended for ‘investigating the causes, driving forces, character, and underlying laws of the process of social transformation’ (xv). The book attempts to achieve this in its six chapters by primarily analysing progress.
However, since the concept of progress initially remains a ‘normatively charged framework’ (2) with a controversial conceptual history, the introduction must first ‘probe’ (19) what is meant by it – and what is not. With Koselleck, Jaeggi therefore first identifies four interrelated ‘problems’ (3) of common understandings of progress. The four have a common denominator in that progress appears as a general movement of history and thus not only eludes the grasp of the individual but also becomes blind to its own potentially negative consequences.
By abandoning the concept of progress, however, certain ‘potentials’ (3) to understand social change would also get lost. Firstly, transformations not only have consequences for the normative grammar of a practice structure. Their ‘materiality’ (10) also changes. Think of the limitation of working hours or the ban on child labour, which significantly improved conditions of living. Secondly, we do not simply experience change, for example in institutions; we want to be able to ‘make sense’ (11) of them. Thirdly, this is linked to the fact that history does not simply take place; by interpreting it, we are always referred to ‘philosophy of history’ (12). Progress is therefore ‘an analytical and explanatory category’ that, contrary to relativism, tries to address the ‘question of normative grounding’ (13).
But how to achieve this high claim? As Jaeggi argues in the first chapter, ‘progress is a sui generis, normative concept’ (20): progress ‘belongs in the category of “thick concepts,” in which description and evaluation enter into an indissoluble union’ (23f.). This results from the fact that it is a process concept that does not simply amount to a ‘desired state’ (24). When contrasted with our everyday experience, it becomes clear that standards and problems themselves go hand in hand with change. Therefore, progress as social change has a ‘Zeitkern’, as Benajmin said, in relation to the specific historical situation. Progress as a form of change can therefore only be understood if we penetrate the constantly changing ‘self-enriching experiential learning process’ (33) that characterises forms of life.
Before we approach the quality of progress as a process of experience, some conditions need to be explained. Chapter two therefore begins with a discussion of the form of change. According to Jaeggi, two common development models are out of the question: progress as ‘expanding the circle’ (37) (advocated by Micheal Walzer) and as the ‘deepening of ideals’ (41) (represented by Axel Honneth). Jaeggi criticises that neither makes it possible to understand how the ‘norms and institutions’ (41, 44) that are deepened or expanded come about. They are taken for granted and not justified. In contrast, transformations are not linear and usually still concern the ‘interpretative framework’ (47) itself. Consequently, the ‘norms and practices’ (48) embedded in discontinuities and continuities that do not merge into a single model.
This raises the question of the nature of norms and how they can be justified if they do not fit into the models under discussion. Chapter three therefore asks what is actually changing when we speak of progress. Jaeggi argues here in two stages. In the first step, she sets out her concept of morality. Morality is not based on an axiomatic ultimate justification, rather morality – following Hegel – ‘is always rooted in ethical life – that is, in the historically specific practices and institutions’ (60). This has consequences for the concept of progress. Because, after all, what is actually progressing? To paraphrase Marx: norms and morals, at any rate, cannot make themselves independent. Secondly, with the theory of forms of life, the ‘site of the changes’, which we call progress, comes into view in the first place. Drawing on her earlier work, Jaeggi says: ‘[f]orms of life are the forms in which a society (re)produces its material and cultural life.’ (73) This justifies the fact that norms and moral concepts are always already embedded in practice and the fulfilment of life. An orthodox Marxist understanding of progress with an ‘in-built true north’ (88) is therefore not possible. Norms can neither be prioritised by argument nor deduced. Jaeggi follows a ‘pragmatist position’ (70) and develops a ‘normative materialism’ (Jaeggi 2022) with the theory of forms of life, as she called it in an interview. Progress as social progress thus becomes comprehensible in a broader sense as a ‘question of social change’ (88).
Having clarified what is changing, we can now discuss how change is triggered. The fourth chapter therefore questions the ‘transformational dynamic‘ (89). Loosely following Marx, Jaeggi distinguishes between a ‘passive and an active element’ (90): material conditions and acting subjects. In practical terms, however, the impetus for change cannot be reduced to one or the other element. Rather, forms of life are structures of practice that always provide subjects with a habitualised way of dealing with the world. In this sense, forms of life are ‘problem-solving entities’ (94) that always change in response to something. But when exactly does something become a problem? Problems initially elude the grasp of forms of life – so-called first-order problems. They become real problems when the ‘conceptual and cultural resources’ are no longer sufficient to deal with them: so-called ‘second-order problems’ (97). In a way, you get problems with the problems. This is an important point for the concept of progress: forms of life progress when they are able to solve second-order problems. Therefore, problems always call into question an entire social structure. Progress then becomes a ‘meta-category of social change’, because it no longer merely emphasises particular changes. It is then no longer sufficient to simply offer technical solutions if social or ecological consequences are not taken into account. Therefore, if problems actually become ‘problematic’ (100) – if the frame of reference is called into question – we must speak of a crisis. There are two possible reactions here: social actors (the active moment) are progressive when they ‘react appropriately’, that is, when they solve a problem and transform themselves accordingly. Regressive are those ‘that perpetuate or produce blockages to experience and learning’ (111). Contrary to its current inflationary use, Jaeggi introduces the concept of crisis here rather perspectively, because it must always be asked, ‘who experiences a given situation as a crisis or problem‘ (102).
This brings us to the fifth chapter, in which the ‘core’ (191) of progress as a form of change is presented. In the debate, the question of a universal measure of progress, is either affirmed or denied by a change that can only be determined contextually, for example by authors such as Richard Rorty or Amy Allen (181). But with Jaeggi, a different picture has emerged so far, through which the question of a comprehensive meaning is perhaps posed incorrectly. Meaning only arises ‘from how we go about our lives’, that is, in reaction to problems. This brings Jaeggi to the conclusion, that ‘societies as such have no goal. They solve problems.’ (127) This reminds one of Habermas, that forms of life make progress through a world that comes towards them. With Hegel, Jaeggi argues in favour of an understanding of progress as an ‘process of enrichment’. Progress occurs when a crisis-ridden situation is overcome by establishing a more complex ‘level of reflexivity’ (132). Therefore, ‘openness’ towards problems is a ‘positive criterion for a rational and appropriate problem-solving process’ (135). Conversely, in line with Adorno’s negativist understanding, progress can be understood as the absence of regression.
Following this comprehensive understanding of progress as social change, the sixth chapter concludes by asking what is actually meant by the sibling concept of regression. According to Jaeggi, regression is to be understood as a ‘blockage to learning’ (148); forms of life do not transform themselves in a way in which crises can be overcome. They tend towards a ‘misdirected attempt to manage conflict’ (158). Regression is not to be equated with conservatism or unlearning. After all, it is precisely an appropriate overcoming of crises that is in question, not the substantial evaluation of their form. ‘Regression is hence a crisis in resolving crises, a second-order problem.’ (169). Regressive forms of life no longer keep pace and develop an ‘inappropriate relation to reality’ (171) because they no longer adequately respond to it.
Rahel Jaeggi has convincingly argued that progress can only be understood as a form of social change. To my knowledge, that’s a unique and urgently needed position within the contemporary debate, because it is mostly fixated on the normative justification of progress. Even decolonial authors such as Amy Allen ‘focus […] on the idea of normative or moral-political progress’ (Allen 2016: 10). Thus, they tend to overlook that progress is a form of social change. But questions can also be addressed about how Jaeggi understands progress as social change. For Jaeggi, at the end of the day, progress seems to be measured by whether a form of life proves to be ‘open’ or ‘rational’ (135) in the face of problems. If we say that society just wasn’t open enough to make progress, then we seem to be assuming another – albeit highly abstract – idea of progress of history. From a Marxist perspective, this ignores that progress itself is socially conditioned. In The Poverty of Philosophy Marx writes: ‘[n]o antagonism, no progress. This is the law that civilisation has followed up to our days. Till now the productive forces have been developed by virtue of this system of class antagonisms.’ (Marx 2010a: 132) Materialistically, progress or regression result from shifting relations of domination. Therefore, the two categories indicate certain directions of social change. Accordingly, progress is made by those classes, groups (or forms of life) who enforce their position in society. Consequently, progress is never a generalised movement of history, but emerges from the always already contradictory development of social relations. Or as Marx said: ‘progress here, and retrogression there.’ (Marx 2010b: 259) What I accept as progress – and I might have good normative reasons for doing so – only becomes social change when it prevails. For example, you may think of liberal democracy what you like, but it can hardly be denied that it is currently experiencing a societal regression due to shifting relations of domination – and that on the other hand authoritarian forces are making progress. Of course, one can criticise what is normatively wrong about society, as Jaeggi or decolonial authors like Allen do. But in order to make a mere normative idea of progress a reality, one first has to fight for it.
Reviewed by Leon Switala